## 1NC

### K

#### Heterosexual society is a series of spaces in which the queer is unsafe and vulnerable to violence. To live as a queer is to experience an indefinite detention within heterosexual society: verbal assaults transform even the most basic of educational experiences into rote memorization of queer inferiority, an inferiority proven to be an actual social fact on asphalt streets where queers are kicked & bashed, produced as a fleshy and discursive body simultaneously policed, disciplined, and exterminated by a population empowered to openly *hate* us and to have their hatred *protected* by the conventions of straight society.

Lamble 2011 (S. *Transforming Carceral Logics: 10 Reasons to Dismantle the Prison Industrial Complex Through Queer/Trans Analysis and Action* in “Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison-Industrial Complex” ed. Eric Stanley and Dean Spade, Pp 235-236)CJQ

2. Queer, trans, and gender-non-conforming people, particularly those from low-income backgrounds and communities of color, are directly targeted by criminalization, punishment, and imprisonment. We do not know exactly how many queer, trans, and gender-nonconforming people are currently incarcerated. This is partly because most governments do not collect information on the sexual and gender identity of prisoners and partly because prisoners are not always safe to disclose their gender or sexual identities. However, we know that queer, trans, and gender-non-conforming people in Canada, the United States, and Britain are frequently over-policed, over-criminalized, and over-represented in the prison system.17 Levels of harassment, targeting, and arrest are high, particularly for young queer and trans people, those from low-income communities, people with learning disabilities and mental health issues, and people of color. Trans community organizers in the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, report that nearly half of the 20,000 transgender people in the region have been in prison or jail.18 Queer, trans, and gender-non-conforming people are funneled into the criminal system for many reasons but primarily due to systemic oppression. Because trans, queer, and gender-variant people experience widespread discrimination, harassment, and violence, we are at greater risk of social and economic marginalization. This translates into higher risks of imprisonment. We know that queer and trans youth, for example, are more likely to be homeless, unemployed, bullied at school, harassed on the street, estranged from family, and targeted by sexual violence—factors that greatly increase the risks of criminalization and imprisonment especially for queer and trans people of color.19 Trans people in particular, and those who are visibly gender-non-conforming, are routinely harassed by law enforcement and security officials for undertaking basic daily activities like using the toilet, accessing public services, or walking down the street.20 Groups like FIERCE! have shown how the “school-to-prison-pipeline” disproportionately affects queer and trans youth.21 Whether dropping out of school because of severe harassment and discrimination, feeling alienated from education curriculum, experiencing suicidal thoughts, or turning to criminalized coping mechanisms like drug and alcohol use, queer and trans youth often have less chances for success in school.22 “Zero tolerance” policies, heightened surveillance, and increased police presence in schools further contribute to criminalization and dropout rates, particularly for queer and trans youth of color. “Quality of life” ordinances, such as “anti-social behavior orders” and “safe streets acts,” are also routinely used to remove queer and trans youth from public spaces and criminalize their social activities.23 Coupled with problems at home, many queer and trans youth find themselves homeless and unemployed.24 Once on the street, queer and trans youth have trouble accessing services and supports to get their basic needs met. Many homeless shelters and social services, for example, are not safe places for trans people (sometimes banning trans people outright), and problems with gender categories on identity documents can restrict welfare access.25 Without income, housing, family, or community support, survival often means working in criminalized economies like drug and sex trade.

#### This incarceration is truly indefinite—whether homeless and on the street or trapped in a closet within the family space, queer/trans people continue to be subject to forms of constraint and captivity that heterosexuals are socially protected from ever experiencing. Trans persons are alienated from their own bodies and queers are alienated from their own desires, constituting everyday life as a life-in-capture,

Stevens 2011 (Eric, *Fugitive Flesh: Gender Self-Determination, Queer Abolition, and Trans Resistance* in “Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison-Industrial Complex” ed. Eric Stanley and Dean Spade Pp 7-8)CJQ

Many trans/queer youth learn how to survive in a hostile world. Often the informal economy becomes the only option for them to make money. Selling drugs, sex work, shoplifting, and scamming are among the few avenues that might ensure they have something to eat and a place to sleep at night. Routinely turned away from shelters because of their gender presentation, abused in residential living situations or foster care, and even harassed in “gay neighborhoods” (as they are assumed to drive down property values or scare off business), they are reminded that they are alone. Habitually picked up for truancy, loitering, or soliciting, many trans/queer people spend their youth shuttling between the anonymity of the streets and the hyper-surveillance of the juvenile justice system. With case managers too overloaded to care, or too transphobic to want to care, they slip through the holes left by others. Picked up—locked up—placed in a home—escape—survive—picked up again. The cycle builds a cage, and the hope for anything else disappears with the crushing reality that their identities form the parameters of possibility.10 With few options and aging-out of what little resources there are for “youth,” many trans/queer adults are in no better a situation. Employers routinely don’t hire “queeny” gay men, trans women who “cannot pass,” butches who seem “too hard,” or anyone else who is read to be “bad for business.” Along with the barriers to employment, most jobs that are open to folks who have been homeless or incarcerated are minimum-wage and thus provide little more than continuing poverty and fleeting stability. Back to where they began—on the streets, hustling to make it, now older—they are often given even longer sentences. While this cycle of poverty and incarceration speaks to more current experiences, the discursive drives building their motors are nothing new. Inheriting a long history of being made suspect, trans/queer people, via the medicalization of trans identities and homosexuality, have been and continue to be institutionalized, forcibly medicated, sterilized, operated on, shocked, and made into objects of study and experimentation. Similarly, the historical illegality of gender trespassing and of queerness have taught many trans/queer folks that their lives will be intimately bound with the legal system.

#### This impact is an ontological captivity that gives way to very real physical violence. The sexualization of violence transforms queer life into a life vulnerable to its own extermination. Straight society has always captured, incarcerated and obliterated queer corporality in a ritual purgation of its own sinfulness, moralizing queer extermination as a form of social “common sense” indispensable to antiqueer straight supremacy.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)CJQ

 “Dirty faggot!” Or simply, “Look, a Gay!”

These words launch a bottle from a passing car window, the target my awaiting body. In other moments they articulate the sterilizing glares and violent fantasies that desire, and threaten to enact, my corporal undoing. Besieged, I feel in the fleshiness of the everyday like a kind of near life or a death- in- waiting. Catastrophically, this imminent threat constitutes for the queer that which is the sign of vitality itself. What then becomes of the possibility of queer life, if queerness is produced always and only through the negativity of forced death and at the threshold of obliteration? Or as Achille Mbembe has provocatively asked, in the making of a kind of corporality that is constituted in the social as empty of meaning beyond the anonymity of bone, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”1 In another time and place, “ ‘Dirty nigger!’ Or simply, ‘Look, a Negro!’ ” (“Sale nègre! ou simplement: Tiens, un nègre!”) opened Frantz Fanon’s chapter 5 of Black Skin, White Masks, “The Lived Experience of the Black” (“L’expérience vécue du Noir”), infamously mistranslated as “The Fact of Blackness.”2 I start with “Dirty faggot!” against a logic of flattened substitution and toward a political commitment to non- mimetic friction. After all, the racialized phenomenology of blackness under colonization that Fanon illustrates may be productive to read against and with a continuum of antiqueer violence in the United States. The scopic and the work of the visual must figure with such a reading of race, gender, and sexuality. It is argued, and rightfully so, that the instability of queerness obscures it from the epidermalization that anchors (most) bodies of color in the fields of the visual. When thinking about the difference between anti- Semitism and racism, which for Fanon was a question of the visuality of oppression, he similarly suggests, “the Jew can be unknown in his Jewishness.” 3 Here it may be useful to reread Fanon through an understanding of passing and the visual that reminds us that Jews can sometimes not be unknown in their Jewishness. Similarly I ask why antiqueer violence, more often than not, is correctly levied against queers. In other words, the productive discourse that wishes to suggest that queer bodies are no different might miss moments of signification where queer bodies do in fact signify differently. This is not to suggest that there is an always locatable, transhistorical queer body, but the fiercely flexible semiotics of queerness might help us build a way of knowing antiqueer violence that can provisionally withstand the weight of generality.4

#### Overkill is ontologically different from other types of violence: the law protects and sustains these forms of violence by treating them as criminal aberrations or as individual homophobia, failing to conceptualize the possibility that heterosexual society founds itself through a bargain bought at the price of queer life. The first question for this debate must be “what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing.” Until that question has been answered we can have no further impact calculus.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)CJQ

Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the postmortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify? The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or gay- panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans- panic defense and received a four- year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans- panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of time, out of History, and into that which comes before.27 In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the specificity of historical and politically located intersections. To this end, the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal democracy, names rights- bearing subjects, or those who can stand as subjects before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal democracy. Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of, but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another way, the spectacular material- semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing.

#### The only OPTION is COMPLETE ABOLITION of the prison-industrial complex: our alternative is to situate yourself in complete opposition to the PIC without reservation and in every possible instance. Asking the question “what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing” reveals the hollow ground of straight supremacy: embrace queerness as a political project in dismantling the walls of each and every form of captivity. The role of this debate is to answer the question of what it means to kill those who have already died.

Stevens 2011 (Eric, *Fugitive Flesh: Gender Self-Determination, Queer Abolition, and Trans Resistance* in “Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison-Industrial Complex” ed. Eric Stanley and Dean Spade Pp 8-9)CJQ

Living through these forms of domination are also moments of devastating resistance where people working together are building joy, tearing down the walls of normative culture, and opening space for a more beautiful, more lively, safer place for all. Captive Genders remembers these radical histories and movements as evidence that our legacies are fiercely imaginative and that our collective abilities can, and have, offered freedom even in the most destitute of times.11 In the face of the overwhelming violence of the PIC, abolition—and specifically a trans/queer abolition—is one example of this vital defiance. An abolitionist politic does not believe that the prison system is “broken” and in need of reform; indeed, it is, according to its own logic, working quite well. Abolition necessarily moves us away from attempting to “fix” the PIC and helps us imagine an entirely different world—one that is not built upon the historical and contemporary legacies of the racial and gendered brutality that maintain the power of the PIC. What this means is that abolition is not a response to the belief that the PIC is so horrible that reform would not be enough. Although we do believe that the PIC is horrible and that reform is not enough, abolition radically restages our conversations and our ways of living and understanding as to undo our reliance on the PIC and its cultural logics. For us, abolition is not simply a reaction to the PIC but a political commitment that makes the PIC impossible. To this end, the time of abolition is both yet to come and already here. In other words, while we hold on to abolition as a politics for doing anti-PIC work, we also acknowledge there are countless ways that abolition has been and continues to be here now. As a project dedicated to radical deconstruction, abolition must also include at its center a reworking of gender and sexuality that displaces both heterosexuality and gender normativity as measures of worth.12 The Stonewall uprising itself must be remembered and celebrated as a moment of a radical trans/queer abolitionist politic that built, in those three nights, the materiality of this vision. As both a dream of the future and a practice of history, we strategize for a world without the multiple ways that our bodies, genders, and sexualities are disciplined. Captive Genders is also a telling of a rich history of trans/queer struggle against the PIC, still in the making. This is an invitation to remember these radical legacies of abolition and to continue the struggle to make this dream of the future, lived today.

### Case

#### The affirmative invokes a prophecy of apocalypse. They foretell a digital war made possible by a theological eschatology of computer-code destruction.

Stevens 2013 (Tim, Prof. War Studies at King College London, “Apocalyptic Visions: Cyber Warfare and the Politics of Time,” April 25 2013, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256370 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256370)CJQ

This suggests apocalypse is also an object of desire, something to be welcomed and, perhaps, brought into being (e.g. Cook, 2004). Apocalypse is not merely the end but also a beginning, a time of both revelation and transformation. An apocalyptic belief in the transformation of the human condition through catastrophe informs the rhetoric of, for instance, the US-led ‘war on terror’ as much as it does the jihadism of those who prompted it (McLaren, 2002; Jackson, 2005: 103-105), even if the utopian ideal of achieving a ‘terror’-free world is as unlikely as Islamist dreams of global caliphate (Gray, 2007). They remain visions no matter how hard one strives to achieve them and are part of a ‘catastrophic’ strand of apocalypticism, pitting good against evil and privileging dystopian and pessimistic views of human nature (Wessinger, 1997). Cyber war scenarios frequently express this catastrophic apocalypticism, yet these eventualities are not entirely unwelcomed. Cyber war as apocalypse is ‘an illumination unveiled precisely at the very moment of the greatest darkness and danger’ (Aho, 1997: 65), a light to dispel the night of political foot-dragging and insufficient cyber security. The catastrophic materialisation of the ‘virtual’ threat is the necessary catalyst through which to achieve this transformation. In this respect, apocalypse operates in its primary sense of ‘revelation’, a ‘singular instant both revealing the meaning of the past and announcing the future’ (Bousquet, 2006: 756), in this case the political errors of the past and the sunlit uplands of a ‘cyber secure’ future. Understood not only as catastrophe but as the revelatory wellspring of transformation, apocalypse need not be wholly negative. Millennial beliefs in better futures are by no means exclusive to religion, amply demonstrated by scientific movements like eugenics, cryonics and space exploration, which share a conviction humankind can be transformed and improved through technology (Bozeman, 1997). The posthumanist movement, specifically in its attention to the coming ‘technological singularity’ is overtly apocalyptic but also emphasises the positive social benefits an information-technological transformation will bring (DeLashmutt, 2006). The technological singularity may be a violent rupture but not necessarily; it may, some argue, have happened already—we just didn’t notice.2 Apocalypse need not be catastrophic but can be ‘progressive’, affirming collective cooperation in bringing about earthly salvation (‘progress’) without the radical violence of divine retribution (Wessinger, 1997). These utopian and transformative impulses are in a long lineage of technoscientific thought, expressing secular rather than religious apocalypticism (Hughes, 2012). How else is apocalyptic cyber war located with respect to this spirit of apocalyptic modernity and postmodernity?

#### Their prophecies of cyber apocalypse reifies the doctrine of providence manifesting in the materialism of the world itself. They stand as the priestly class, ruling in the name of an angelic council of cyberwarfare experts, reverse-engineering the legitimacy of their own rule.

Agamben 2011 (Giorgio, Prof. Philosophy at European Graduate School, “For the Kingdom and the Glory,” Pp. 113-114)CJQ

An exhaustive reconstruction of the immense debate on providence that, in pagan, Christian, and Judaic cultures, began with the Stoics and reached almost without interruption the threshold of modernity is out of the question . Rather, this debate interests us only to the extent to which it constitutes the place in which the theologico-economical paradigm and the fracture between being and praxis that it entails take the form of a government of the world and, vice versa, the government presents itself as an activity that can be thought only if ontology and praxis are divided and coordinated "economically. " In this sense, we can say that the doctrine of providence is the privileged theoretical field in which the classical vision of the world, with its primacy of being over praxis, begins to crack, and the deus otiosus gives way to a deus actuosus. Here, we need to analyze the meaning and the implications of this divine activity of government. It has often been noted that one of the crucial points of the dispute on providence concerned, from the very beginning, the distinction between general and particular (or special) providence. At its base lies the stoic distinction between that which can be found in a primary way (proegoumenos) in the plans of providence and that which is rather produced as a concomitant or secondary effect (kat' epakolouthesin or parakolouthesin) of it. The history of the concept of providence coincides with the long and fierce debate between those who claimed that God provides for the world only by means of general or universal principles (providentia generalis) and those who argued that the divine providence extends to particular things-according to the image in Matthew 10:2.9, down to the lowliest sparrow (providentia specialis and specialissima) . If we accept general providence and reject, entirely or in part, particular providence, we have the position of Aristotelian and late classical philosophy, and, in the end, deism (which, in Wolff's words, "concedes that God exists, but denies that he takes care of human things" : Wolff, II, 2, p. 1.91) . If, on the other hand, we accept at the same time the two forms of providence, we have the position of the Stoics, theism, and the dominant trend of Christian theology, for which the problem of how to reconcile special providence with man's free will arises. However, what is really at stake in the debate is not man's freedom (which the proponents of the second thesis attempt to preserve through the distinction between remote and proximate causes) , but the possibility of a divine government of the world. If the Kingdom and the Government are separated in God by a clear opposition, then no government of the world is actually possible: we would have, on the one hand, an impotent sovereignty and, on the other, the infinite and chaotic series of particular (and violent) acts of providence. The government is possible only if the Kingdom and the Government are correlated in a bipolar machine: the government is precisely what results from the coordination and articulation of special and general providence-or, in Foucault's words, of the omnes and the singulatim.

## 2NC

### K

#### This antagonistic and parasitic relation between the straight and the queer produce violent clashes, sexualizing and pathologizing identity—war, whiteness and imperialism intertwine with heterosexism and capitalism to make international military conflict the highest expressions of straight machismo. The straight state is outdated and tacky—their politics are stale—it’s time to act up. Again, we echo the Mary Nardini gang:

(Mary Nardini gang, clandestine criminal queers from Wisconsin, “Toward the Queerest Insurrection,” available at <http://zinelibrary.info/files/QueerestImposed.pdf>)

See, we’ve always been the other, the alien, the criminal. The story of queers in this civilization has always been the narrative of the sexual deviant, the constitutional psychopathic inferior, the traitor, the freak, the moral imbecile. We’ve been excluded at the border, from labor, from familial ties. We’ve been forced into concentration camps, into sex slavery, into prisons. The normal, the straight, the american family has always constructed itself in opposition to the queer. Straight is not queer. White is not of color. Healthy does not have HIV. Man is not woman. The discourses of heterosexuality, whiteness and capitalism reproduce themselves into a model of power. For the rest of us, there is death. In his work, Jean Genet 1 asserts that the life of a queer, is one of exile - that all of the totality of this world is constructed to marginalize and exploit us. He posits the queer as the criminal. He glorifies homosexuality 2 and criminality as the most beautiful and lovely forms of conflict with the bourgeois world. He writes of the secret worlds of rebellion and joy inhabited by criminals and queers. Quoth Genet, “Excluded by my birth and tastes from the social order, I was not aware of its diversity. Nothing in the world was irrelevant: the stars on a general’s sleeve, the stock-market quotations, the olive harvest, the style of the judiciary, the wheat exchange, flower-beds. Nothing. This order, fearful and feared, whose details were all inter-related, had a meaning: my exile.”

#### Queerness is social death by way of sexualized alienation—the institution of the closet atomizes queers and prevents the development of a critical consciousness against heterosexism. There are no institutions of civil society to which the queer can appeal—the institutional labels enforced by the mainstream movement and codified in LGBT can’t do justice to the lived oppression of the queer. Every facet of heterosexual society is contoured to the extermination of queerness—reject their ideologies of neutrality.

#### The Mary Nardini gang writes:

(Mary Nardini gang, clandestine criminal queers from Wisconsin, “Toward the Queerest Insurrection,” available at <http://zinelibrary.info/files/QueerestImposed.pdf>)

VI

A fag is bashed because his gender presentation is far too femme.

A poor transman can’t afford his life-saving hormones.

A sex worker is murdered by their client.

A genderqueer persyn is raped because ze just needed to be “fucked straight”.

Four black lesbians are sent to prison for daring to defend themselves against a straight-male attacker.1

 Cops beat us on the streets and our bodies are being destroyed by pharmaceutical companies because we can’t give them a dime. Queers experience, directly with our bodies, the violence and domination of this world. Class, Race, Gender, Sexuality, Ability; while often these interrelated and overlapping categories of oppression are lost to abstraction, queers are forced to physically understand each. We’ve had our bodies and desires stolen from us, mutilated and sold back to us as a model of living we can never embody Foucault says that “power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.” We experience the complexity of domination and social control amplified through heterosexuality. When police kill us, we want them dead in turn. When prisons entrap our bodies and rape us because our genders aren’t similarly contained, of course we want fire to them all. When borders are erected to construct a national identity absent of people of color and queers, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble.

#### Do not hide behind the rainbow flag—the language of multicultural inclusion and pacification is the constant move of authoritarians everywhere, espousing the goodwill of the masters. Make this debate a direct action extravaganza.

Mattilda 2011 (Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore, self-described “gender queer, faggot, and a queen, on the trans continuum,” radical activist, writer, troublemaker, “An Interview with Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore,” http://wewhofeeldifferently.info/interview.php?interview=110)CJQ

Most people with power hide behind the rainbow flag and figure out ways to oppress everyone else and get away with it. People ask me what the alternative is and I think the beginning of the alternative is to be able to articulate the horrible violence that is happening and not to conform to this sort of “sweatshop produced rainbow flag” vision of normality. CM: And also to insist that there people that do not feel represented by that movement, and that there are people that exist outside of those ideas of what being gay, lesbian, or trans is, don’t you think? MBS: Absolutely, and also to create more space for people on the margin. CM: In your work you have talked about the idea of opening up more space for people to live better lives, as opposed to taking away things. Can you speak about that? MBS: When I identify as “queer,” it is just not about being queer sexually, it is about being queer in every way: It is a way of creating alternatives to mainstream notions of love, who you fuck, what you look like, how you eat, and how you live. I want to be able to challenge the violence that is happening. That is what I learned from “direct action activism.” I was also involved with Gay Shame, a group that emerged in New York in 1998. Originally what we wanted to do was to create a radical alternative to “Gay Pride.” Instead of having an endless gated procession of corporate floats, we thought we would just invite people for free into a space to share skills and strategies for resistance. We had bands, music, dancing and also people talking about welfare reform, trans liberation, or gentrification in New York. We thought we could make culture on our own terms. When I moved to San Francisco we started Gay Shame there along similar lines, it was a “direct action extravaganza”; we were committed to challenging the hypocrisy, not just of mainstream gay people but also of all hypocrites.

#### The state and straight civil society are founded on the structural elimination and extermination of queer people. This is a form of incarceration and deferred death. The aff’s invocation of the state as innocent and violence as conflictual rather than structural is a willful ignorance paid to queer suffering.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)CJQ

If for Agamben bare life expresses a kind of stripped- down sociality or a liminal space at the cusp of death, then near life names the figuration and feeling of nonexistence, as Fanon suggests, which comes before the question of life might be posed. Near life is a kind of ontocorporal (non) sociality that necessarily throws into crisis the category of life by orientation and iteration. This might better comprehend not only the incomprehensible murders of Brazell, Paige, and Weaver, but also the terror of the dark cell inhabited by the queer survivor of the Holocaust who perished under “liberation.”33 Struggling with the phenomenology of black life under colonization, Fanon opens up critical ground for understanding a kind of near life that is made through violence to exist as nonexistence. For Fanon, violence is bound to the question of recognition (which is also the im/possibility of subjectivity) that apprehends the relationship between relentless structural violence and instances of personal attacks evidenced by the traumatic afterlives left in their wake. For Fanon, the Hegelian master/slave dialectic, as theoretical instrument for thinking about recognition, must be reconsidered through the experience of blackness in the French colonies. For Fanon, Hegel positions the terms of the dialectic (master/slave) outside history and thus does not account for the work of the psyche and the historicity of domination like racialized colonization and the epidermalization of that power. In other words, for Fanon, when the encounter is staged and the drama of negation unfolds, Hegel assumes a pure battle. Moreover, by understanding the dialectic singularly through the question of self- consciousness, Hegel, for Fanon, misrecognizes the battle as always and only for recognition. Informed by Alexandre Kojève and Jean- Paul Sartre, Fanon makes visible the absent figure of Enlightenment assumed by the Hegelian dialectic. For Fanon, colonization is not a system of recognition but a state of raw force and total war. The dialect cannot in the instance of colonization swing forward and offer the self- consciousness of its promise. According to Fanon, “For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work.”34 Hegel’s dialectic that, through labor, offers the possibility of self- consciousness, for the colonized is frozen in a state of domination and nonreciprocity.35 What is at stake for Fanon, which is also why this articulation is helpful for thinking near life, is not only the bodily terror of force; ontological sovereignty also falls into peril under foundational violence. This state of total war, not unlike the attacks that left Brazell, Paige, and Weaver dead, is at once from without — the everyday cultural, legal, economic practices — and at the same time from within, by a consciousness that itself has been occupied by domination. For Fanon, the white imago holds captive the ontology of the colonized. The self/Other apparatus is dismantled, thus leaving the colonized as an “object in the midst of other objects,” embodied as a “feeling of nonexistence.”36 While thinking alongside Fanon on the question of racialized difference, violence, and ontology, how might we comprehend a phenomenology of antiqueer violence expressed as “nonexistence”? It is not that we can take the specific structuring of blackness in the French colonies and assume it would function the same today, under U.S. regimes of antiqueer violence. However, if both desire and antiqueer violence are embrocated by the histories of colonization, then such a reading might help to make more capacious our understanding of antiqueer violence today as well as afford a rereading of sexuality in Fanon’s texts. Indeed, Fanon’s intervention offers a space of nonexistence, neither master nor slave, written through the vicious work of epistemic force imprisoned in the cold cell of ontological capture. This space of nonexistence, or near life, forged in the territory of inescapable violence, allows us to understand the murders of queers against the logics of aberration. This structure of antiqueer violence as irreducible antagonism crystallizes the ontocorporal, discursive, and material inscriptions that render specific bodies in specific times as the place of the nothing. The figuration of near life should be understood not as the antihuman but as that which emerges in the place of the question of humanity. In other words, this is not simply an oppositional category equally embodied by anyone or anything. This line of limitless inhabitation, phantasmatically understood outside the intersections of power, often articulated as “equality,” leads us back toward rights discourse that seeks to further extend (momentarily) the badge of personhood. The nothing, or those made to live the death of a near life, is a break whose structure is produced by, and not remedied through, legal intervention or state mobilizations. For those who are overkilled yet not quite alive, what form might redress take, if any at all?

#### Queerness cannot be combined with their positive political program—queer is complete rejection of the tyranny of normalcy; recognizing the daily extermination and violence enacted against the queer and actually trying to do something about it requires that we also move away from things like the state. Any risk that any part of the plan or the rhetorical performance of the 1AC requires that a queer revolution fight against it. To quote the Mary Nardini gang:

(Mary Nardini gang, clandestine criminal queers from Wisconsin, “Toward the Queerest Insurrection,” available at <http://zinelibrary.info/files/QueerestImposed.pdf>)

Queer is not merely another identity that can be tacked onto a list of neat social categories, nor the quantitative sum of our identities. Rather, it is the quali­tative position of opposition to presentations of stability - an identity that problematizes the manageable limits of identity. Queer is a ter­ritory of tension, defined against the domi­nant narrative of white-hetero-monogamous-patriarchy, but also by an affinity with all who are marginalized, otherized and oppressed. Queer is the abnormal, the strange, the dan­gerous. Queer involves our sexuality and our gender, but so much more. It is our desire and fantasies and more still. Queer is the cohesion of everything in conflict with the heterosexual capitalist world. Queer is a total rejection of the regime of the Normal. II As queers we understand Normalcy. Normal, is the tyranny of our condition; reproduced in all of our relationships. Normalcy is violently reiterated in every minute of every day. We understand this Normalcy as the Totality. The Totality being the interconnection and overlapping of all oppression and misery. The Totality is the state. It is capitalism. It is civilization and empire. The totality is fence-post crucifixion. It is rape and murder at the hands of police. It is “Str8 Acting” and “No Fatties or Femmes”. It is Queer Eye for the Straight Guy. It is the brutal lessons taught to those who can’t achieve Normal. It is every way we’ve limited ourselves or learned to hate our bodies. We understand Normalcy all too well. III When we speak of social war, we do so because purist class analysis is not enough for us. What does a marxist economic worldview mean to a survivor of bashing? To a sex worker? To a homeless, teenage runaway? How can class analysis, alone as paradigm for a revolution, promise liberation to those of us journeying beyond our assigned genders and sexualities? The Proletariat as revolutionary subject marginalizes all whose lives don’t fit in the model of heterosexual-worker. Lenin and Marx have never fucked the ways we have. We need something a bit more thorough - something equipped to come with teeth-gnashing to all the intricacies of our misery. Simply put, we want to make ruins of domination in all of its varied and interlacing forms. This struggle inhabiting every social relationship is what we know as social war. It is both the process and the condition of a conflict with this totality. IV In the discourse of queer, we are talking about a space of struggle against this totality - against normalcy. By “queer”, we mean “social war”. And when we speak of queer as a conflict with all domination, we mean it.

#### They reference their proximity to knowledge-production as students but their global orientation fails to accommodate for the queer; only the nihilistic materialism of queer revolutionary politics can do justice to queerness.

Edelman 2004 (Lee, Prof. English Tufts, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Pp. 4-5)CJQ

Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order-such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer-but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force of negativity into "some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible-to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism -I do not intend to propose some "good" that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the "good," can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that's always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic's undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for "none of the above," for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law's foundational act, its self-constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jonissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer.

#### There’s an assimilation disad to the perm; the perm overcodes queer difference within a heterosexist order by folding queer activism within a straight frame of reference—affirming the particularity of queer positionality is a prior question.

Bersani 2010 (Leo, Prof. French at UC – Berkeley, “Is the Rectum a Grave? And other essays,” Pp. 40-41, University of Chicago Press)CJQ

The psychoanalytic inquiry can be politicized in ways generally not allowed for by queer theorists. Like Eve Sedgwick, most of these thinkers feel that accounts of the origin of sexual preference and identity in individuals run counter to politically gay- affi rmative work. The trouble is that gay affirmation has become a tame affair, which is perhaps inevitable when we are that suspicious of sexual identities. Queer rhetoric, as in Butler’s definition of lesbians as people who know how homophobia operates against women, can be deliberately inflammatory, but in rejecting the sexual specificity of queerness we have become more and more inclined to define our communitarian goals in terms provided by the homophobic community. It seems at times as if we can no longer imagine anything more politically stimulating than to struggle for acceptance as good soldiers, good priests, and good parents. While I remain enough of a liberal to believe that we should defend people’s rights to serve whatever worthy or unworthy cause inspires them, I’m more excited by some glorious precedents for thinking of homosexuality as truly disruptive—as a force not limited to the modest goal of tolerance for diverse lifestyles, but perhaps even mandating the choice of an outlaw existence. That choice (which I’ll elaborate on in a moment) would be quite different from what currently passes for queer politics. Suspicious of any enforced identity, gays and lesbians play subversively—a word I’ve come to distrust, since it doesn’t seem to mean much more than engaging in naughty parodies—with normative identities, attempting, for example, to resignify the family for communities that defy the usual assumptions about what constitutes a family. These efforts can have assimilative rather than subversive consequences; having de-gayed themselves, gays melt into the very culture they like to think of themselves as undermining. Or, having “realistically” abandoned what Steven Seidman, in his essay for Fear of a Queer Planet, calls a “millenial vision” of dominations’s demise, we resign ourselves to the micropolitics of local struggles for participatory democracy and social justice—not shying away, as Seidman puts it, “from spelling out a vision of a better society in terms resonant to policy makers and activists.” We thus reveal political ambitions about as stirring as those reflected on the bumper stickers that enjoin us to “think globally and act locally.”

#### The end result is a self-erasing politics—any risk of a link carries a potential politics of seduction, the internalization of heterosexist desire which turns all revolutionary politics against itself.

Bersani 2010 (Leo, Prof. French at UC – Berkeley, “Is the Rectum a Grave? And other essays,” Pp. 14-15, University of Chicago Press)CJQ

The dead seriousness of the gay commitment to machismo (by which I of course don’t mean that all gays share, or share unambivalently, this commitment) means that gay men run the risk of idealizing and feeling inferior to certain representations of masculinity on the basis of which they are in fact judged and condemned. The logic of homosexual desire includes the potential for a loving identification with the gay man’s enemies. And that is a fantasy- luxury that is at once inevitable and no longer permissible. Inevitable because a sexual desire for men can’t be merely a kind of culturally neutral attraction to a Platonic Idea of the male body; the object of that desire necessarily includes a socially determined and socially pervasive definition of what it means to be a man. Arguments for the social construction of gender are by now familiar. But such arguments almost invariably have, for good political reasons, quite a different slant; they are didactically intended as demonstrations that the male and female identities proposed by a patriarchal and sexist culture are not to be taken for what they are proposed to be: ahistorical, essential, biologically determined identities. Without disagreeing with this argument, I want to make a different point, a point understandably less popular with those impatient to be freed of oppressive and degrading self- defi nitions. What I’m saying is that a gay man doesn’t run the risk of loving his oppressor only in the ways in which blacks or Jews might more or less secretly collaborate with their oppressors—that is, as a consequence of the oppression, of that subtle corruption by which a slave can come to idolize power, to agree that he should be enslaved because he is enslaved, that he should be denied power because he doesn’t have any. But blacks and Jews don’t become blacks and Jews as a result of that internalization of an oppressive mentality, whereas that internalization is in part constitutive of male homosexual desire, which, like all sexual desire, combines and confuses impulses to appropriate and to identify with the object of desire.

#### Casting debate in the terms of the future works for a Child whose face subtends a logic of reproductive futurism, shoving the queer aside in the name of ideological purity.

Edelman 2004 (Lee, Prof. English Tufts, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Pp. 1-2)CJQ

By showing the President, in the words of the Times, as "a concerned, hard-working parent" -as one committed to the well-being of those least able to care for themselves, and specifically as "the defender of children, on issues like education and drugs" -these public service announcements seemed likely to heighten his moral stature and, with it, his standing with the American electorate, or so feared Alex Castellanos, a Republican media consultant. "This is the father picture," he complained in the pages of the Times, "this is the daddy bear, this is the head of the political household. There's nothing that helps him more." 1 But what helped him most in these public appeals on behalf of America's children was the social consensus that such an appeal is impossible to refuse. Indeed, though these public service announcements concluded with the sort of rhetorical flourish associated with hard-fought political campaigns ("We're fighting for the children. Whose side are you on?"), that rhetoric was intended to avow that this issue, like an ideological Mobius strip, only permitted one side. Such "self-evident" one-sidedness, the affirmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the Child whose innocence solicits our defense-is precisely, of course, what distinguishes public service announcements from the partisan discourse of political argumentation. But it is also, I suggest, what makes such announcements so oppressively political; political not in the partisan terms implied by the media consultant, but political in a far more insidious way: Political insofar as the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the logic of the political itself must be thought. That logic compels us, to the extent that we would register as politically responsible, to submit to the framing of political debate-and, indeed, of the political field-as defined by the terms of what this book describes as reproductive futurism: terms that impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations.

#### The state is produced by networks of power and not the other way around—statist politics are incapable of negotiating the absurdism of citizenship, relying on an internalization of fascist regimes of self-control as a substitute for ethical action.

Ruffolo 2009 (David V., University of Toronto, “Post-Queer Theory” Pp. 88-89)CJQ

The state no longer forms classes but is produced by classed bodies. The civilized capitalist machine deterritorializes the socius through the intensification of bodies in the periphery to benefit the center. Although Deleuze and Guattari are largely referring to developed (center) and underdeveloped (periphery) countries, we see through post-colonial theorizations such as Bhattacharyya that a clear distinction between the center and the periphery can not be made: the underbelly of neoliberal capitalism and globalization has many internal peripheries within the center and many internal centers within the periphery. The illicit movement of people and things provides new means for encountering the “center” through an engagement with surplus values. As Deleuze and Guattari state, “a veritable ‘development of underdevelopment’ on the periphery ensures a rise in the rate of surplus value, in the form of an increasing exploitation of the peripheral proletariat in relation to that of the center” (231). Keeping in mind, however, that there are no explicit centers and peripheries but instead a multiplicity of schizophrenic networks. Citizenship is therefore highly masochistic in the Deleuzian sense because citizens are on both sides of the flow of production: the worker produces surplus in order to attain purchasing power. Life is a production of production where citizenship becomes less of a legal status in relation to a State and instead becomes an ability to purchase the exchanged products that one produces through the rhizomatic networks of states. The contractual alliances inherent to neoliberal capitalism and globalization maintain a permanent state of suspense where citizenship is “an indefinite awaiting of pleasure and an intense expectation of pain” (Deleuze 1989, 71)..

#### Debate is already unfair—It’s just a question of who the law works for. Their fairness arguments exclude queer dissent in the name of an objective liberal subjectivity which is impossible.

Winnubst 2006 (Shannon, Asst. Prof. Women’s Studies, “Queering Freedom,” 2006 Pp. 54-5)CJQ

We must then ask the difficult and painful question of whether the law, with its own grounding in a neutrality that attempts to attenuate the effects of history, is the appropriate space in which to attempt to remedy the violences of systems of oppression. How can a system that reads history as accidents, which are external to the ontology of subjectivity and therefore must be overcome, function as a judge of when and whether historical violence has been remedied? How can a system that grounds itself in the apolitical, ahistorical, a-material realm of the neutral individual claim to resolve violent differences of power, history, and materiality? Iris Marion Young argues that advocates of affirmative action must shift the categories of their positions away from the myths of neutrality if they are to address the power differentials (of racism or sexism) that they are aiming to resist. Offering compelling evidence from arenas such as standardized testing in education and systems of judgment in employment settings, Young shows that neutrality is impossible when assessing merit (1990, 200–214). She thereby argues for a retooling of the concept of equality away from its grounding in neutrality. Developing a process of “democratic decisionmaking,” Young argues against the myth of objectivity and, implicitly drawing on feminist standpoint theory, argues for the inclusion of many voices in determining standards of judgment. As she urges us away from neutrality and its restricted reading of difference as a burden, she suggests that “equality . . . is sometimes better served by differential treatment” (1990, 195). Young thereby uncovers the unnecessary and invidious connection between neutrality and equality.31 In tying equality to neutrality, the framework of classical liberalism requires the erasure of history, power, and differences for the maintenance of freedom and equality. But what if history, power, and differences cannot be erased? What if they are the ontological conditions in which humans exist? Or, even worse, what if the lure of erasing them—or of acting as if they can be erased—is a fundamental tool of phallicized whiteness, one that will always perpetuate its domination?

#### The logic of utility produces male bodies which are productive and feminine bodies which are to be looked at—the male gaze extracts a surplus value from the sight of the female body, culminating in a patriarchal political economy which makes their impact calculus bound up in networks of privilege.

Winnubst 2006 (Shannon, Asst. Prof. Women’s Studies, “Queering Freedom,” 2006 Pp. 164)CJQ

Utility’s gendering of bodies may seem old hat and obvious by now. Surely we know that masculine bodies are the ones that work hard (but not too hard) and produce useful commodities for the marketplaces—whether economic, intellectual, political, spiritual, or moral. Masculine bodies produce things. Conversely, feminine bodies, as idealized through phallicized whiteness, are put on their pedestals because they were never even made for working. As Bataille voices that which should perhaps remain unspoken (if the phallus is to remain veiled): “the prostitute[, as the perfection of femininity,] is the only being who logically should be idle”(1988–91, 2:146).8 Feminine bodies perform their femininity perfectly when they behave as beautiful bodies untainted by even a trace of material servitude: only female bodies of the upper, non-working class can display ‘true femininity.’ In fact, it is through this pure inutility that female bodies become the ‘natural’ arbiters of good taste and the quintessential consumers, fixing the role of shopper as the subject position that bridges the gap between the 1950s ideal housewife and the contemporary sixteen-year-old female target of all marketing. How do women fit into the closed economy of utility? We shop ’til we drop. And yet are women not simultaneously the exemplary commodities exchanged? And is not the exchange value determined precisely by their disavowal of any role at all in the economy of utility? Following Irigaray here, we see that feminine bodies perform the merging of aesthetics and utility perfectly: it is in their beauty that feminine bodies are deemed valuable. It is in their complete disavowal of all crass utility that feminine bodies are judged useful to the (specular) economy.

#### Here’s the impact: Heterosexism constructs a future that’s nothing more than phallicized whiteness—always waiting to arrive, never quite yet here—the promises of liberal reformism fail to secure meaningful community for the queer. Reject heterosexist guilt—adopt the radical secession of the alt.

Winnubst 2006 (Shannon, Asst. Prof. Women’s Studies, “Queering Freedom,” 2006 Pp. 169-170)CJQ

Progress is, of course, one of the most treasured myths of western cultures. As a myth, both generally and particularly, it hovers outside of time. Klee’s infamous Angelus Novus and Benjamin’s beautiful riffs on it invert the temporal orientation of this myth. But Klee’s angel is beholding the wrong scenes: facing the debris and wreckage of the past, it does not understand the freedom of Progress. Progress cannot face the past—and this is what sets us liberal individuals free. Progress is the mad rush toward the wild, wild west that Mike Davis chronicles in City of Quartz, a dash that cannot worry over the dangers or debris it leaves in its reckless past. Just as the temporality of the anticipated apology exonerates all present moments from any violences they might inflict, so too does the march of Progress blind us to any moment but the final one of salvation. The one to which we are destined, the one that frees us from our past. The one that never arrives. Shaped by the combined temporalities of Protestant guilt and Progress, white guilt also faces the present from this strangely distant future that fails ever to exist in time. Phallicized white cultures are intensely responsible to these twin structures, the Protestant work ethic and Progress. The future standpoint toward which they orient experience functions as the standpoint of judgment. All acts are judged with reference to them. Rather than weakening their authority, the immateriality of this non-temporal, non-historical moment that never arrives grants these twin structures of phallicized whiteness their power of judgment. The future is invisible and ubiquitous—those same characteristics that empower whiteness. And the pursuit of it is unfailing, giving forth relentless judgment against any act that obstructs its (impossible) attainment. White guilt emerges from its responsibility to these myths and values of Progress and the Protestant work ethic. Whatever recognition of past violences that is at work in white guilt springs from these twin structures of authority, judging past acts—conceptualized discretely and safely from the present—as failures of whiteness’s own standards, proper work ethics and progress. The guilt of white guilt, expressed in its acts of confession, emerges from a recognition that these values have been derailed, not from any deep engagement with the past. The guilt of white guilt speaks a deep fealty to utility.

## 1NR

### Case

#### Nanotech leads to unrestricted damage on the environment and biosphere functioning, and legal codification fails. That turns your futurism claims because your case

This is your authors, but more recent

Mike Treder, executive director of Center for Responsible Nanotechnology and BS in Biology from University of Washington, and Chris Pheonix, Director of Research at CRN and studied nanotechnology for more than 15 years, MS in computer science from Stanford, "Nanotechnology: Dangers of Molecular Manufacturing," Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, last updated 7 February 2008, http://www.crnano.org/dangers.htm

Collective environmental damage is a natural consequence of cheap manufacturing, as are health risks. (MORE) Molecular manufacturing allows the cheap creation of incredibly powerful devices and products. How many of these products will we want? What environmental damage will they do? The range of possible damage is vast, from personal low-flying supersonic aircraft injuring large numbers of animals to collection of solar energy on a sufficiently large scale to modify the planet's albedo and directly affect the environment. Stronger materials will allow the creation of much larger machines, capable of excavating or otherwise destroying large areas of the planet at a greatly accelerated pace. It is too early to tell whether there will be economic incentive to do this. However, given the large number of activities and purposes that would damage the environment if taken to extremes, and the ease of taking them to extremes with molecular manufacturing, it seems likely that this problem is worth worrying about. Some forms of damage can result from an aggregate of individual actions, each almost harmless by itself. Such damage is quite hard to prevent by persuasion, and laws frequently don't work either; centralized restriction on the technology itself may be a necessary part of the solution. Finally, the extreme compactness of nanomanufactured machinery will tempt the use of very small products, which can easily turn into nano-litter that will be hard to clean up and may cause health problems.

#### This has a profoundly anti-political tendency; calcifying state power behind security experts who are both the cause and effect of cyber insecurity shifts the ontological center of focus from the individual relation to Being which is the heart and meaning of a truly secure way of life and the naïve tribalism of the affirmative’s doom-saying.

Agamben 2011 (Giorgio, Prof. Philosophy at European Graduate School, “For the Kingdom and the Glory,” Pp. 145-146)CJQ

While in the book on Monotheism as a Political Problem Peterson resolutely denies, in contrast to Schmitt, the legitimacy of a political-theological interpretation of Christian faith, he nonetheless affirms at the same time with equal determination the politico-religious character of the Church. For this reason it is all the more striking that he continues to make comparisons with the profane political sphere: "In the same way that the emperor, in being accompanied by his bodyguards, expresses the publicity [ 0./fentlichkeit] of his political dominion, so Christ appearing at mass with angels as his bodyguards, expresses the publicity of his politico-religious lordship" (ibid. , p. 223) . But this "public" character has not " been conferred on the Church by the State; it belongs to it from its origin, inasmuch as it has a Lord that, in the same way as he has a celestial kingdom, also possesses a celestial publicity" (ibid.) . The political nature of which Peterson speaks consists, in other words, entirely in the relation that worship establishes , by way of the participation of angels, with this "celestial publicity" : "The relation between the Ekklesia and the celestial polis is [ . . . ] a political relation, and for this reason the angels must always enter into the acts of worship of the Church" (ibid.) . The reason for the exclusion of political-theology begins to be revealed here: if politics, from the Christian standpoint, is solely an angelological-cultual relation between the Church and the celestial kingdom, all extrapolation of this "politico-religious" character from the worldly sphere is illegitimate. In Christian eschatology, every possible theological meaning of worldly politics has been exhausted once and for all : " That celestial worship has an originary relation with the political world in the Book of Revelation is explained by the fact that the apostles have abandoned the earthly Jerusalem, as the center of politics and worship, to turn to the celestial Jerusalem, as a city and regal court, but also as a temple and place of worship. Another fact is linked to this, that is, that the anthem of the Church transcends all national anthems, in the same way that the language of the Church transcends all others. To conclude, it should be noted that such an eschatological transcendence has as a final consequence that the entire universe is borne along by the song of praise" (ibid. , p. 206) .